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 ‘DISSOLVING CONDOMINIUM, PRIVATE TAKINGS,
AND THE NATURE OF PROPERTY’
Douglas C. Harris & Nicole Gilewicz*
. INTRODUCTION
The condominium statutes that many common law jurisdictions introduced in the
1960s facilitate the subdivision of buildings into multiple private titles. Where there
was once a single freehold or fee simple interest, after condominium legislation it
becomes relatively straightforward, using what Carol Rose describes as “off the rack
entitlements” set out in statute, to createmany such interests within a building.1 These
individually titled parcels of land are supported, protected, and serviced by common
property, and under the statutory schemes the holders of individual freehold or fee
simple titles within condominium are also co-owners of that common property, each
holding an undivided share of the whole.2 That share may be divided equally among
title holders, or calculated based on floor areas or some other method for recognizing
differing values among the parcels. As owners and co-owners, the title holders are
entitled to participate in the collective governance of the private and common prop-
erty, and have an obligation to contribute to the maintenance and repair of the com-
mon property in proportion to their share. It is this combination of rights and
responsibilities – individual title to a defined parcel of land, an undivided share of
the common property, a right to participate in the governance of the property, and
a shared obligation to maintain the common property – that defines condominium.3
* DouglasC.Harris (BA, LLB, LLM, PhD) is anAssociate Professor and theNathan T.Nemetz Chair in Legal
History in The University of British Columbia's Peter A. Allard School of Law. He was a Visiting Fellow at
NewCollege, Oxford,when this article waswritten. E-mail: harris@allard.ubc.ca.Nicole Gilewicz is amem-
ber of the JD graduating class of 2015 at TheUniversity of BritishColumbia. The authors thank Susan Bright,
Cole Harris, Jason Leslie, Rachael Walsh, Kevin Zakreski, and two anonymous reviewers for their com-
ments on earlier versions of this paper, and Dentons Canada LLP for funding a summer internship.
1. C. Rose, ‘What Governments Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa)’, in N. Mercuro & W.J. Samuels
(Eds.), The Fundamental Interrelationships between Government and Property, Routledge, New York,
1999, pp. 212-226, at pp. 217-218.
2. Some common-law jurisdictions use ‘freehold’, others use ‘fee simple’ to describe the interests in land
that are held by the person who is commonly understood as the owner. We use freehold, except in our
discussion of the cases from British Columbia, where fee simple is the common term.
3. In this paper we use condominium, the oldest and most common label for the legal form that facilitates
the subdivision of buildings intomultiple titles. Other terms for the same legal form include ‘strata title’,
‘divided co-ownership’, ‘horizontal ownership’, ‘sectional title’, and ‘commonhold’.
Condominium constructs a community of title holders.4 In most cases, the commu-
nity is not intentional in the sense of like-minded people choosing to live together
for a particular purpose other than to hold individual titles.5 Condominium permits
many individuals to hold separate titles to land within a single building.6 That is its
principal virtue, and what differentiates statutory condominium from other legal
forms – including cooperatives, leasehold, and tenancy in common structures – that
are also used to subdivide interests within buildings.7 Condominium enables the
repackaging of interests of land into smaller, separate parcels and joins them, through
co-ownership of common property, with other individual titles to distribute the costs
of construction and maintenance. In Amnon Lehavi’s typology of property hybrids,
condominium is one of a larger group of common-interest communities that create
mixed private–common property regimes.8 By producing physically smaller interests
in land and distributing some of the costs of land ownership among co-owners, this
private–common property hybrid enables some, whomight not otherwise afford it, to
purchase a freehold interest in land. Indeed, it is the capacity of condominium to
expand the property-owning franchise that most excited some of the early observers
of the legal form in North America.9
Condominium legislation utilizes a corporate form to provide the community of title
holders with a mechanism for governing their private and common property. Title
holders have voting rights to elect a condominium council, and the processes of
the council are usually set out in draft by-laws that accompany the statutory schemes.
Some decisions will be left to the council, but others require a direct vote of title
holders. Whatever the scale of decision, condominium legislation creates a
4. We have chosen ‘title holders’ rather than ‘owners’ or ‘members’ because it references the attribute of
condominium – individually held titles – that distinguishes it from other arrangements for subdividing
property interests within buildings.
5. A. Lehavi, ‘How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community’, 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law
2009, pp. 43-76, analyzes the different impacts of property rights in intentional, planned, and sponta-
neous communities.
6. C.G. van der Merwe, ‘The South African Sectional Titles Act and Israeli Condominium Legislation’, 14
Comparative and International Journal of South African Law 1981, pp. 129-164, at pp. 132-134, describes two
broad categories of condominium systems: universalistic and dualistic. In the universalistic, more com-
mon in continental Europe, the co-ownership interest is the primary interest, while individual owner-
ship is ancillary. The dualistic system gives primacy to the individual interest, while the co-ownership
interest plays a secondary and supporting role. Common-law jurisdictionswith statutory condominium
have adopted the dualistic model and that is our focus.
7. P. Butt, Land Law, 6th edn, Lawbook Co., Sydney, 2010, at pp. 854-857.
8. A. Lehavi, ‘Mixing Property’, 38 SetonHall LawReview 2008, pp. 137-212. Common-interest communities
or developments (CICs or CIDs) describe residential enclaves that commonly use condominium, coop-
erative, or housing association to construct private and commonproperty interests and somemeasure of
private government. See E. MacKenzie, ‘Common Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow’,
14 Housing Policy Debate 2003, pp. 203-234.
9. A. Rosenberg, Condominium in Canada, Canada Law Book, Toronto, 1969, at pp. 1.2-1.3.
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governance structure to enable the community of title holders to regulate the uses of
private interests, manage and maintain the common property, and generally to avoid
the potential gridlock (memorably described by Michael Heller as the “tragedy of the
anticommons”) that the fragmentation of property interests might produce.10
Perhaps the single most important decision in the lifecycle of a condominium is the
one to dissolve it.11 We use ‘dissolution’ rather than ‘termination’ to describe the end
of a condominium because it better describes the breaking apart of the constituent
elements. The process of dissolving a condominium involves terminating the individ-
ually titled freehold interests and winding up the condominium corporation. On dis-
solution, the former title holders become co-owners, as tenants in common, of all the
property that was formerly within condominium, including the private and common
property. However, this co-ownership interest is usually fleeting: the purpose of dis-
solving a condominium ismost often to realize the value from the sale of the land held
in common. Indeed, the impetus to dissolve a condominium usually arises when the
co-ownership interests on dissolution have a greater exchange value than the sepa-
rately titled interests within condominium.12 Title holders pursue dissolution to max-
imize the exchange value of the assets formerly within the legal form. Most
commonly, this is the result of the gains to be had from re-developing land, the need
for extensive renovation of the common property, or some combination of the two,
and we discuss several examples below.
Not surprisingly, the question of whether to dissolve a condominium usually
becomes more pressing as buildings age. Most of the common-law world introduced
condominium legislation in the 1960s, and title holders within condominium build-
ings, particularly those constructed in the early decades of the statutory schemes,
increasingly confront significant renovation expenses. Moreover, escalating land pri-
ces and, in some cases, changes to municipal zoning or development regimes create
pressure to redevelop land. Some land-scarce jurisdictions such as Singapore have
actively sought to encourage redevelopment of older properties as one means to cre-
ate new housing.13
10. M. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’, 111
Harvard Law Review 1998, pp. 621-688.
11. H. Easthope, et al., ‘How Property Title Impacts Urban Consolidation: A Life-Cycle Examination of
Multi-title Developments’, 32 Urban Policy and Research 2014, pp. 289-304, use the biological concept
of lifecycle to describe the different challenges and legal issues that confront a condominium develop-
ment from formation to dissolution.
12. L. Sim, S. Lum& L.Malone-Lee, ‘Property Rights, Collective Sales and Government Intervention: Aver-
ting a Tragedy of the Anticommons’, 26 Habitat International 2002, pp. 457-470, at p. 458, refer to this as
an ‘en bloc sale’ in order to capitalize on the ‘marriage value’.
13. Id.; see also K. Ter, ‘A Man’s Home Is [Not] His Castle – En Bloc Collective Sales in Singapore’, 20 Sin-
gapore Academy of Law Journal 2008, pp. 49-98.
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When the exchange value of co-ownership interests on dissolution exceeds that of
individually titled interests within condominium, some title holders may push for
dissolution. Other title holders may oppose it, hoping to retain their individual titles
within condominium as a continuing entity. Anticipating this potential for conflict
between title holders, condominium legislation establishes dissolution rules. Those
rules differ across jurisdictions and we discuss the different regimes in part 10.2,
but in brief outline, there are two basic variations. Most common is what we refer
to as the supermajority rule: a supermajority of title holders, usually at least two-thirds
and commonlymore, may force the dissolution of condominium. The other approach –
the unanimity rule – requires unanimous consent among title holders to dissolve con-
dominium. Non-consensual dissolution and the involuntary loss of titles to land are
still possible in regimeswith a unanimity rule, orwhere the threshold is notmet under
the supermajority rule, but only with court intervention. This is also the case in the
few jurisdictions that allow dissolution only with court supervision.
The capacity of some title holders to dissolve condominium over the objections of other
title holders, and thus to end freehold interests without consent, is an extraordinary
power. Those who hold titles outside condominium cannot combine to force the termi-
nation of a neighbor's title. This power ismost pronounced in jurisdictions that permit a
supermajority to dissolve condominium, but it also exists in jurisdictions where title
holders may seek a court order for dissolution over the objections of other title holders.
We argue that the non-consensual dissolution of condominium is a form of private tak-
ings. In effect, where condominium legislation allows dissolutionwithout consent, gov-
ernments have delegated to title holders the power to terminate the property interests
of other title holders. The particular individuals with this power are not named or iden-
tified in advance; instead, condominium statutes identify a certain class of title holders
(usually forming a supermajority in favor of dissolving condominium) and delegate to
that class the power to divest another class of title holders (usually a minority opposed
to dissolution) of their individual freehold titles. Sometimes courts supervise the pro-
cess, but that is not uniformly required where the necessary threshold is met in juris-
dictions with a supermajority rule.
Should dissolving condominium require unanimity? Should every title holder need to
consent to the termination of his or her title? Or, if a majority of title holders wish to
maximize the exchange value of their assets by dissolving condominium, should they
be entitled to do so over the objections of a minority? If so, should dissolution require
court oversight, or may some pre-determined proportion of title holders impose
dissolution without the need to involve the courts? Governments and law reform
bodies in the Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales, and the Cana-
dian province of British Columbia have considered these questions,14 and in July
14. The British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI),Report on Terminating a Strata (BCLI Report no. 79), February
2015, provides detailed and thorough treatment. The Australian papers include: Queensland Govern-
ment, Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry Development, ‘Body Corporate and Community
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2015, the government of New SouthWales circulated draft legislation incorporating a
supermajority threshold.15 In November, British Columbia amended its condomin-
ium legislation to shift the province to a supermajority rule.16 Among the earlier
movers from unanimity to supermajority rules, there have been subsequent attempts
to limit the consequences of the change. Singapore, which shifted to a supermajority
rule in 1999, followed up with additional procedural safeguards for title holders in
dissolution proceedings, and the Florida legislature passed legislation in 2015 to bol-
ster protections for dissenting title holders following its move to a supermajority rule
in 2007.17
Our goal in this paper is not to advocate for a unanimity or a supermajority rule.
Instead, we characterize the non-consensual dissolution of condominium as private
takings in order to reveal that the choice between dissolution rules is also a choice
between different conceptions of property. We argue that to ask what the dissolution
rule should be is also to ask what property within condominium should be, and our
intent is to bring this important policy choice to the fore.18
We begin part 10.2 with an overview of various dissolution rules in common-law
jurisdictions with statutory condominium regimes. We then describe the rule as it
has developed in British Columbia before turning to several court cases from the
province that reveal the common issues associated with the dissolution of condo-
minium. Two of the conflicts we discuss arise under a rarely used common-law
condominium form which employs a simple majority rule, and they proceed to
the British Columbia Supreme Court as actions for the partition of co-owned
property.19
Management: Into the 21st Century, A Discussion Paper on Community Living Issues in Queensland’,
July 2004, at pp. 25-27; NSW Government, ‘Making NSW No. 1 Again: Shaping Future Communities,
Strata and Community Title Law Reform Discussion Paper’, 15 September 2012, at pp. 22-27; and NSW
Government, ‘Strata and Community Title Law Reform Position Paper’, November 2013, at pp. 20-22.
15. Draft Strata Schemes Development Bill 2015 (NSW) cls. 153-190 (released for public consultation 15 July
2015), online <www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/biz_res/ftweb/pdfs/About_us/Have_your_say/Strata_
schemes_development_bill_2015.pdf>. See the response from C. Sherry, ‘Strata law overhaul a step
too far’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 2015, online <www.smh.com.au/comment/strata-law-
overhaul-a-step-too-far-20150823-gj5mz5.html>, describing the move to non-consensual dissolution as
enabling “private citizens to compulsorily acquire other people’s homes”.
16. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c43, as amended by SBC 2015, c40, ss 37-55.
17. See the discussion in part 10.2 beginning note 44.
18. On the importance of recognizing choice in property law, see D. Kennedy, ‘Some Caution about Prop-
erty Rights as Recipe for Economic Development’, 1 Accounting, Economics, and Law 2011, pp. 1-62, at p.
62: “A property regime, like any other legal order is all about choices. Small and large, these choices
cannot be made by reasoning outward from the nature of property or general ideas about what consti-
tutes ‘good law’. They require economic, social and ethical analysis, andmust bemade and contested in
those terms”.
19. Mowat v. Dudas, 2012 BCSC 454; McRae v. Seymour Village Management Inc., 2014 BCSC 714.
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In part 10.3, we develop the argument that the non-consensual dissolution of condo-
minium is a form of private-to-private takings by addressing a number of possible
objections to this categorization. Presaging that discussion, the non-consensual disso-
lution of condominium results in the termination of property interests, but not their
acquisition by the parties instigating dissolution. As a result, we use ‘takings’ rather
than other common terms such as ‘expropriation’ or ‘compulsory acquisition’, follow-
ing Van der Walt who notes that ‘takings’ includes the limiting or terminating of inter-
ests and does not also require the acquisition those interests.20 We follow Waring in
describing these takings as ‘private-to-private’ takings to emphasize that one private
entity is instigating the termination of property at the expense of another.21 In doing
so, we understand private-to-private takings as a subset of the broader category of pri-
vate takings that includes takings by a public intermediary which acquires the land
from one private entity to transfer it to another. Bell describes these as ‘government-
mediated private takings’ and differentiates them from ‘delegated private takings’,
which do not involve the state, or at least not directly after the initial delegation of tak-
ings authority or the enforcement of the right to take.22
Having positioned non-consensual dissolution as an exercise of a takings power, we
then turn in part 10.4 to a small portion of the vast literature on takings. In various
ways, this literature identifies an underlying tension between different conceptions
of property that animates much of the debate about the appropriate use of the takings
power. These conceptions are identified somewhat differently: Singer describes them
as ‘castle’ and ‘investment’ models of ownership,23 Rose as ‘propriety’ and ‘prefer-
ence satisfaction’ conceptions of property,24 and Calebrasi and Melamed as ‘property
rule’ and ‘liability rule’ protections for entitlements.25 We draw from these scholars
the idea that two competing conceptions of property – one that defends property
interests themselves and another that protects the exchange value of property inter-
ests – underlie debate about the appropriate use of the takings power and, in our case,
the capacity of private actors to instigate the non-consensual taking of property. In
short, the legislative choice between a supermajority rule or a unanimity rule, or
20. A.J. van derWalt,Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1999, at
p. 18.
21. E.J.L. Waring, ‘Private-to-Private Takings and the Stability of Property’, 24 King’s Law Journal 2013, pp.
237-259. See also E.J.L. Waring, ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’, inN. Hopkins (Ed.),Modern Studies
in Property Law Vol. 7, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013, pp. 420-437.
22. A. Bell, ‘Private Takings’, 76 University of Chicago Law Review 2009, pp. 517-585, at pp. 545, 548.
23. J.W. Singer, ‘The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obliga-
tions’, 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 2006, pp. 309-338.
24. C. Rose, ‘“Takings” and the Practices of Property: Property as “Wealth”, Property as “Propriety”’, in
Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership, Westview Press,
Boulder, 1994, pp. 49-70.
25. G. Calabresi & A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral’, 85 Harvard Law Review 1971, pp. 1089-1128.
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the judicial choice between ordering or declining to order the dissolution of condo-
minium, is also a choice between different conceptions of property and between dif-
ferent roles for the institution of property.
The takings literature is not the only place to seek guidance about the extent to
which, and circumstances under which, some title holders may be permitted to force
the dissolution of condominium. Condominium legislation utilizes the corporate
form to construct a governance regime among title holders, and the issues raised
in the winding up of companies over the objections of some shareholders may well
be instructive in the dissolution of condominium. We have chosen to focus instead
on the takings literature because the dissolution of condominium involves, first and
foremost, the loss of an interest in land. It is a desire to protect an interest in land, not
shares in a corporation, that animates those who dissent and thus suggests that the
takings literature may be particularly relevant and useful. Another place to turn
might be the literature on the partition of co-owned property. Indeed, two of our
examples from British Columbia proceed to court under a motion for an order to
sell co-owned property.26 One outcome of the partition of co-owned property is
its sale and distribution of proceeds, but that is not a necessary result if the property
is divisible. Moreover, what is lost in such a forced sale is title to co-owned property,
not title to a separate freehold interest, which marks the dissolution of condomin-
ium. As a result, we have turned to the takings literature. Other literatures might
well be helpful were our aim to canvas all possible analogues to the dissolution
of condominium with a view to pronouncing on the merits of a particular regime.27
Instead, our goal is to reveal that the choice – for legislators when considering dis-
solution rules, and for judges when deciding between litigants whowant to dissolve
or sustain condominium – is between competing conceptions of, and functions for,
property.
In some cities, condominium is becoming the principal legal architecture for
owning land, particularly for new-build residential properties.28 It is now, using
Dagan’s characterization, an increasingly significant property institution in struc-
turing the ownership of land.29 As a legal form, it exists primarily to create indi-
vidual titles, but it does so within structures of co-ownership and collective
governance that are indelibly bound to the individual titles. In the concluding part
10.5, we turn to the work of scholars who use ideas such as ‘hybrid property’,30 the
26. Mowat, supra note 19; McRae, supra note 19.
27. See e.g. the analysis in BCLI (2015), supra note 14, including the recommendation to adopt a superma-
jority rule at pp. 53-57.
28. SeeD.C.Harris, ‘Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver’, 36 Law&Social Inquiry
2011, pp. 694-726; G. Rosen & A. Walks, ‘Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo-ism as Urban Transforma-
tion’, 37 Journal of Urban Affairs 2015, pp. 289-310.
29. H. Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
30. Lehavi 2008, supra note 8.
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‘liberal commons’,31 or ‘governance property’32 to explain legal forms that com-
bine private and common property and to suggest what they entail for under-
standings of ownership and property. In doing so, we argue that the rule for
dissolving condominium is important not only for determining the nature and function
of property within condominium, but, more generally, for establishing the nature and
function of property in land. This increasingly prolific form of ownership deserves our
attention not only because of its growing prevalence, but also because it has the capacity
to reorient our understandings of property by accentuating the embeddedness of private
property within community.
. NON-CONSENSUAL DISSOLUTION OF CONDOMINIUM IN STATUTES
AND THE COURTS
The circumstances under which title holders within statutory condominium regimes
are permitted to instigate the non-consensual dissolution of condominiummay be set
out in the enabling statutes, left to the courts or, most commonly, determined through
some combination of statutory direction and judicial discretion. Although there is
considerable variation in the detail among jurisdictions, there are two basic
approaches, distinguished by the degree of consent required among title holders in
order to dissolve condominium. The most common approach is a supermajority rule:
title holders within condominium may decide, by special vote usually requiring a
majority of at least two-thirds, to dissolve condominium.33 This is the regime in a
majority of Canadian provinces,34 that is recommended in the United States in the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,35 that is currently proposed in the Austra-
lian state of New South Wales36 and that has been adopted in Singapore in 1999,37
in England and Wales when commonhold was introduced in 2002,38 in Florida in
31. G. Alexander, ‘Governance Property’, 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2011, pp. 1853-1887.
32. H. Dagan & M. Heller, ‘The Liberal Commons’, 110 Yale Law Journal 2000, pp. 549-623.
33. Because of the complexity of some of the regimes, in the notes that follow we reference recent scholarly
literature discussing the dissolution provisions in each jurisdiction rather than the statutes themselves.
34. See the survey of Canadian provinces in BCLI (2015), pp. 37-40 and 113-118, supra note 14.
35. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
(2008), Big Sky Montana, 18-25 July 2008. Section 2-118 allows for termination of a common-interest
community by a termination agreement garnering at least 80% consent. For an early analysis of the dif-
ferent approaches within the United States, see P.K. Rohan, ‘Drafting Condominium Instruments: Pro-
visions for Destruction, Obsolescence and Eminent Domain’, 65 Columbia Law Review, 1965, pp. 593-624.
36. Draft Strata Schemes Development Bill 2015, supra note 15.
37. Sim et al. (2002), supra note 12; Ter (2008), supra note 13.
38. Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, c15, s. 43(1)(c) requires 80% of association members to con-
sent in order to voluntarily wind-up. See C. Webster & R. Goix, ‘Planning by Commonhold’, Economic
Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005, pp. 19-23; S. Blandy, ‘Legal Frameworks for Multi-Owned Housing in
England and Wales: Owners’ Experiences’, in Blandy, J. Dixon & A. Dupuis (Eds.),Multi-Owned Hous-
ing: Law, Power and Practice, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010, pp. 13-34, pp. 29-30; and see also L. Xu,
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2007,39 and in British Columbia in 2015.40 Thresholds of consent vary among these juris-
dictions, but 80% is themostwidely adopted proportion of title holders needed to effect
dissolution. Some jurisdictions permit a condominium council to set the threshold hig-
her. The other, less common approach in statutory condominium regimes is to require
unanimous agreement among title holders to dissolve condominium. This unanimity
rule applies in a minority of Canadian provinces, in most Australian states,41 in Malay-
sia,42 and in South Africa.43 However, whether operating under a supermajority rule or
unanimity rule, all jurisdictions provide title holders with an option to approach the
courts for a dissolution order if the threshold has not been met.
Singapore has attracted considerable attention for its decision tomove, in 1999, from a
unanimity rule to a supermajority rule as part of its response to the need for more
housing. Labeled a matter of ‘national interest’, legislators lowered the consent
threshold for dissolving condominium because the unanimity rule was thought to
inhibit urban renewal.44 In doing so, they established different thresholds according
to the age of the building: 90% of the title holders can trigger dissolution in buildings
newer than 10 years old, 80% in buildings of 10 or more years.45 However, removing
the need for unanimous consent unleashed what Ter describes as an “en bloc frenzy”
that was “unprecedented and unparalleled anywhere else in the world”.46 Moreover,
the rapid escalation in sales of condominium buildings for redevelopment was driven
not only by residents wishing to realize the value of their units through a collective
sale, but also by speculating ‘condo-raiders’ or ‘serial enblockers’who targeted build-
ings with development value, purchased units, and agitated for collective sale.47 A
significant backlash from those who were pushed out of their homes, or from those
who feared it, caused Singapore to review the dissolution rules and, while not altering
thresholds, in 2007 it added new procedural requirements intended primarily to
‘Commonhold Developments in Practice’, inW. Barr (Ed.),Modern Studies in Property Law, Vol. 8, Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2015, pp. 331-350.
39. Fla. Stat. Condominium Act § 718.117 (2007).
40. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c43 as amended by SBC 2015, c40.
41. In its recommendation that New SouthWales adopt a super majority rule, the Property Council of Aus-
tralia, ‘Strata and Community Scheme Review: Submission to the NSWDepartment of Finance and Ser-
vices’ (February 2012) at p. 9, provides a brief summary of dissolution rules in the Australian states. The
Northern Territories is the only state with a super majority rule.
42. See T.K. Sood, Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia, 4th edn, LexisNexis, Singapore, 2012, p. 431.
43. SeeA. Boraine & P. O’Brien, ‘TheWinding-up of a Body Corporate Established in Terms of the Sectional
Titles Act In re: Body Corporate of Caroline Court [2002] 1 All SA 49 (SCA)’, 65 THRHR 2002, pp. 307-316;
G.J. Pienaar, Sectional Titles and other Fragmented Property Schemes, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 2010, pp. 270-283.
44. Ter 2008, supra note 13, p. 98: “As long as there is strong economic growth and stability and a booming
propertymarket, the demand for landwill exceed supply and en bloc sales will continue to flourish. One
has to give up one’s castle in the national interest”.
45. Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act 1999 (No. 21 of 1999), Part VA.
46. Ter 2008, supra note 13, p. 49.
47. Id., pp. 52, 54.
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safeguard minority title holders, if not from the dissolution of the condominium, then
from harassment and abuse in the process.48
Singapore is not the only jurisdiction grappling with the repercussions of moving
from a unanimity rule to a supermajority rule. In 2007, Florida amended its condo-
minium legislation, replacing a unanimity rule with a supermajority threshold of
80%.49 In doing so, legislators explained that they were acting to preserve the value
of property within condominium:
the Legislature further finds that it is the public policy of this state to provide by statute a
method to preserve the value of the property interests and the rights of alienation thereof
that owners have in the condominium property before and after termination.50
However, the subsequent increase in non-consensual, developer-instigated dissolu-
tions provoked charges that the lawwas ‘un-American’ in its failure to protect property
rights,51 and in 2015 Florida introduced additional procedural safeguards, including a
provision to enable a dissenting block of 10% to stop non-consensual dissolution.52
The year before Singapore introduced a supermajority rule, British Columbiamoved in
the other direction. Several decades of rapid growth and poor construction in the Cana-
dian province’s condominium sector leftmany title holderswithwater-damaged build-
ings and crippling renovation costs. In response to what had become known as the
‘leaky condo crisis’, the province commissioned a former premier “to inquire into
[…] the adequacy of protection for, and accountability to, consumers for faulty condo-
minium construction”.53 The resulting recommendations did not address the question
of dissolution, but when it rewrote its condominium (strata title) legislation in 1998,
British Columbia replaced a little understood set of ‘deemed destruction’ provisions,
which used fictive destruction to allow a supermajority to dissolve condominium,with
a unanimity rule.54 If title holders were unanimous, then the strata plan could be
48. Id., pp. 96-97. See also K. Ter, ‘En Bloc Sales in Singapore – Critical Developments in the Law’, 21 Sin-
gapore Academy of Law Journal 2009, pp. 485-516; T.K. Sood, ‘Collective Sales in Singapore’, 22 Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 2010, pp. 66-109.
49. Fla. Stat., Condominium Act § 718.117 (2007).
50. Id., § 718.117(1) (2007).
51. HelioDe La Torre, ‘Un-AmericanCondo Termination LawNeeds to BeChanged’,Daily Business Review,
26 September 2014. See also the reply: Mark B. Schorr, ‘In Rebuttal: Another Take on Condo Termination
Law’, Daily Business Review, 1 October 2014.
52. Fla. Stat. Condominium Act § 718.117(3) (2015).
53. D. Barrett, Commission of Inquiry into the Quality of Condominium Construction in British Columbia
‘The Renewal of Trust in Residential Construction’, ‘Terms of Reference’, Victoria, June 1998.
54. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 272(1). See BCLI (2015), supra note 14, pp. 11-16, on the history of the
dissolution provision in British Columbia. See alsoD. Pavlich, Condominium Law in British Columbia, But-
terworths, Vancouver, 1983.
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cancelled, the strata corporation wound up, and the former title holders would become
co-owners of the land that had been within condominium.55
Despite the attention directed toward the features of condominium ownership in the
commission and subsequent legislative revisions in British Columbia, there appears
to have been little discussion about the dissolution provisions. The public record
focuses not on the choice between unanimity or supermajority rules, but rather on
the need to simplify and clarify the process.56 Removing the need for a court order
if there were unanimous consent among title holders was seen to simplify the process.
If unanimity could not quite be achieved in a strata corporation of ten or more units
(only one dissenting vote, or less than 5% of voters opposed), then the revised legis-
lation provided a mechanism whereby a supermajority (75%) of eligible voters (a
broader category than just title holders) could pass a resolution that the strata corpo-
ration seek a court order to invalidate the dissenting votes in the dissolution vote, pro-
viding it “is in the best interests of the strata corporation and would not unfairly
prejudice the dissenting voter or votes”.57 If a court were to grant this order, then dis-
solution would proceed as if there had been a unanimous vote.58 Alternatively, any
individual title holder or the holder of a mortgage on any individual title could seek a
court order to dissolve the condominium.59 In considering whether to grant this
order, courts were instructed to ask if “the winding up would be in the best interests
of the owners, registered charge holders and other creditors”,60 and in determining
‘best interests’, the courts were to consider:
a. the scheme and intent of this Act,
b. the probability of unfairness to one or more owners, registered charge holders or other
creditors, if winding up is not ordered, and
c. the probability of confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata corporation or the
owners if winding up is not ordered.61
The shift in 2015 to a supermajority rule, which allows 80% of title holders to force
dissolution of condominium, includes a requirement for court confirmation of a strata
corporation’s dissolution resolution if there are 5 or more strata lots. In determining
whether to make this order, the courts are directed to consider the following:
55. Id., 272(2).
56. British Columbia, Official Report of the Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 36th Parl., 3rd Sess.,
Vol. 12, No. 4 (23 July 1998) pp. 10379-10381 (Hon. J. MacPhail; R. Coleman).
57. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 52.
58. See BCLI (2015), supra note 14, pp. 16-29, for detail of the dissolution (termination) procedures.
59. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c43, s 284(1).
60. Id., s 284(2), subsequently amended by SBC 2015, c 40, s 54.
61. Id., s 284(3), subsequently amended by SBC 2015, c 40, s 54. See BCLI (2015), supra note 14, pp. 29-31, for
detail of the court-ordered dissolution procedures.
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a. the best interests of the owners, and
b. the probability and extent, if the winding-up resolution is confirmed or not confirmed, of
(i) significant unfairness to one or more
(A) owners, or
(B)holdersof registeredchargesagainst landshownonthe strataplanor landheld in the
name of or on behalf of the strata corporation, but not shown on the strata plan, and
(ii) significant confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata corporation or of the
owners.62
The non-consensual dissolution of condominium has been rarely litigated in British
Columbia, but some predict a deluge of litigation as buildings age and development
pressures escalate.63 To date, there are only three court decisions from British Colum-
bia that consider petitions for non-consensual dissolution. The statutory provisions
for court-ordered dissolution in the 1998 amendments arise only indirectly in two
of them, but the three cases nonetheless reveal the sources of conflict over dissolution
that are common across jurisdictions.
Cypress Gardens is a 177-unit, residential townhouse and apartment development in
North Vancouver. Built in 1962, the former rental property was later converted into a
common-law condominium development.64 The common-law form was intended to
mimic the statutory form in function and operation,with slightly different legalmechan-
ics. Within this common-law condominium structure, title holders became co-owners of
a single fee simple interest covering the whole property, and this was combined with
rights to the exclusive occupation of a particular unit, to access the common property,
and to participate (through shares in a corporation) in the governance of the complex.
In 2011, a developer made an offer to buy Cypress Gardens, intending to maximize
the permitted density under the prevailing zoning by-law by demolishing the aging
buildings and re-developing the lot. Some within Cypress Gardens wanted to sell.
They noted the need for expensive renovations and claimed that the “state of disre-
pair”made individual sale difficult.65 Moreover, they believed the exchange value of
their co-ownership interest in the fee simple would be greater if the whole property
were sold to the developer than if they arranged individual sales. Other owners did
not want to dissolve Cypress Gardens. Even with the substantial renovation costs
(there was much disagreement about the costs of needed repairs), they wanted to
62. Id., s. 284(3).
63. F. Bula, ‘Condo owners face-off in property-rights tiff’, The Globe and Mail, 9 April 2012 online:<www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/condo-owners-face-off-in-property-rights-tiff/article
2396711/>; BCLI (2015), pp. 9-10, supra note 14.
64. Mowat, supra note 19, para 27. In 1994, British Columbia prohibited future common law condominium
developments: Land Title Act, SBC 1994, c 26, s 7; see current version of provision in RSBC 1996, c 250,
s. 73(4).
65. Id., paras 21, 23.
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retain their interests within the common-law condominium. In the context of rising
property values, dissolution would not only push them out of the complex, but also
out of the neighborhood and even municipality. The exchange value of their co-own-
ership interest on the dissolution of Cypress Gardens might be greater thanwhat they
would receive in an individual sale (this point was contested as well), but would not
be enough to purchase elsewhere in the city.
One group of title holders within Cypress Gardens, who together held approximately
30% of the units, petitioned the British Columbia Supreme Court under the Partition
of Property Act for an order enabling them to proceed with the sale.66 The respon-
dents to the action included a group of ‘consenting respondents’, who opposed the
process but not the sale of Cypress Gardens, and another larger group opposing
the sale. Many of the latter testified, and much of Justice Ehrcke’s judgment recounts
the evidence of those opposing the partition and sale.67 It is clear that the testimony
had an impact, for Justice Ehrcke summarized it as follows:
The evidence before me demonstrates that an order for sale would force particularly vulner-
able people out of their homes, including young children, single parents, the elderly, the
infirm, and people of very limited financial means. There would be a negative impact on
the children, who would suffer the disruption of having to move, change schools, and
develop new support networks, if indeed their parents were even able to find new accom-
modation to purchase, which in many cases is doubtful. Many of the respondents have
deposed that they were only able to buy their homes at Cypress Gardens because the prices
there were much lower than for other accommodation on the North Shore, and that if there
were a sale, the proceeds would be insufficient for them to find suitable replacement
housing.68
It is also clear that Justice Ehrcke understood the title holders in Cypress Gardens as
owners of their homes, and that ‘suitable replacement housing’meant comparable home
ownership. In a later paragraph, the prospects of being forced either to rent in order to
remain in the municipality or to move to another municipality appear equally dire:
Moreover, many of the respondents would not be able to finance the additional cost of pur-
chasing replacement accommodation, with the result that they would lose their homes and
be forced either to rent or to move to a different municipality, far from their work, their
friends, and their children’s schools.69
Equating the dislocation of a move to a different municipality with the shift from
owner to renter reflected a perception of value in the status of homeowner. Onemight
66. Partition of Property Act, RSBC 1996, c 347, ss 2, 6.
67. Mowat, supra note 19, paras 91-94.
68. Id., para. 162.
69. Id., para. 167.
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not have the right to a particular home, but homeownership included the right not to
be involuntarily dispossessed of that status.70 Justice Ehrcke declined to grant the
order for partition and sale. He left the common-law condominium, and the interests
within it, intact.
Seymour Estates, another common-law condominium development in North Van-
couver, became the site of similar conflict between title holders. Built in the late
1960s, and needing major renovation, the title holders received a developer’s offer
that exceededwhat each could securewere they to sell their individual interests. Some
wanted to dissolve the condominium, others wanted to stay, and the conflict ended
up in the courts.71 The title holders seeking dissolution brought an action for an order
to proceed with the partition and sale of property. However, whereas only 30% of the
title holders in Cypress Gardens had petitioned to partition and sell the land, 92% of
title holders in Seymour Estates joined the petition. Only 9 of 114 title holders were
opposed. Justice Fenlon summarized the parties, their positions, and her decision
as follows:
In the case beforememore than 90% of the owners have concluded that a sale of the property
will not only permit them to maximize their current investment but will also give them an
opportunity to move into a new, modern unit which will not carry with it the risk of signif-
icant capital expenditures and which will be easier to both manage and sell in the future.
The respondents’ view is, understandably, that it is not fair for them to be forced from their
homes. I acknowledge how difficult that prospect is, but forced sale of co-owned property
has been part of our law for a very long time. Shared ownership has advantages. It permits
those who might not otherwise be able to own a home to do so, but it also has significant
disadvantages – a forced sale by the other co-owners is one of them.72
The right to home ownership within the common-law condominium for a minority of
title holders had to give way to the interests of a large majority of title holders who
wished to sell in order to maximize their investment. That was part of what co-own-
ership entailed. Justice Fenlon granted the order for partition and sale, and Seymour
Estates was no more.73
70. On the role of status preservation in takings, see R. Godsil and D. Simunovich, ‘Protecting Status: The
Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership’, 77 Fordham Law Review 2008,
pp. 949-998.
71. McRae, supra note 19.
72. Id., paras. 43-44. See F. Bula, ‘Shared property owners in North Vancouver can force sale, B.C. Supreme
Court rules, The Globe and Mail, 21 January 2014 online <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-
columbia/shared-propery-owners-in-north-vancouver-can-force-sale-court-rules/article16423781/>.
73. In fact, there was further litigation to resolve a dispute over competing offers. See Cox v. Seymour Village
Management Inc., 2015 BCSC 275.
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Garnering consensus within large condominium developments may be particularly
difficult, but the case of Strata Plan VR 1411 demonstrates that unanimity can never
be assumed when there is more than one title holder.74 Initially constructed in viola-
tion of the City of Vancouver’s height by-law, shoddymodifications to the three-unit,
two-building condominium created serious structural problems and substantial
water damage. The buildings needed extensive renovation, but the title holders could
not agree on the division of costs. As a result, one of the title holders in the two-unit
building (and the only resident-owner) sought and secured a court order requiring all
title holders to contribute to the cost of repairs based on their shares of the common
property.75 The court also appointed an administrator to oversee the work and the
division of expenses. When that process foundered, the resident-owner secured a sec-
ond court order assessing special levies against the other title holders to fund the ren-
ovations.76 Consultant’s, administrator’s, and lawyer’s fees continued to escalate, but
nothingwas spent on repairs and the parties ended up in court a third timewith coun-
tervailing actions. The resident-owner sought a third assessment order; the other title
holders sought an order to dissolve the condominium. Noting the ‘fundamental dis-
agreement’ between title holders and their ‘dysfunctional’ relationship, Justice Curtis
indicated that it would be unfair to the two non-resident title holders not to dissolve
the condominium.77 Neither had the funds to cover their likely shares, and nor, it see-
med, did the resident-owner. Moreover, he seemed convinced by the evidence that to
order repairs, even if they could be funded, would compel significant expenses that
could not be recovered in a subsequent sale of individual units. Justice Curtis refused
to grant a third assessment order.78 However, he also declined to grant the dissolu-
tion. Despite appearing to view it the better option, he gave the parties another oppor-
tunity “to contemplate the possibilities as there may be better ways to realize their
respective interests”.79
Cypress Gardens, Seymour Estates, and Strata Plan VR 1411 illustrate two common
scenarios that produce conflict over the dissolution of condominium. The first arises
when some within condominium wish to take advantage of a development windfall
that would create additional value were the condominium dissolved and the land
sold. The second is a consequence of the need to undertake extensive repair or reno-
vation that some wish to conduct while others want out. They can arise together, as
was the case in Cypress Gardens and Seymour Estates, but whether development
74. Buchanan v. Strata Plan VR1411, 2008 BCSC 977.
75. In British Columbia, this is called the ‘unit entitlement’. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 1.
76. Id., paras. 8, 16.
77. Id., paras. 37-38. Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 284(3)(b) and (c) directs a court to consider ‘the
probability of unfairness to one ormore owners’ and ‘the probability of confusion and uncertainty in the
affairs of the strata corporation or the owners’ if it does not make an order to wind-up the strata
corporation.
78. Id.
79. Id., para. 39.
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windfall, expensive renovations, or both, conflict will arise when some title holders
wish tomaximize the value of their interests by dissolving condominiumwhile others
wish to retain their titles within condominium.
. NON-CONSENSUAL DISSOLUTION OF CONDOMINIUM
AS PRIVATE-TO-PRIVATE TAKINGS
Our argument is that the non-consensual dissolution of condominium in which some
title holders force the termination of all individual titles within condominium is an
exercise of the takings power. In an early commentary on condominium in Canada,
Risk noted that a minority may raise ‘the cry of expropriation’ where a majority can
force the dissolution of condominium.80 Ter has made a similar point in consecutive
articles on the phenomenon of collective or en bloc sales in Singapore, describing the
forced dissolution and sale of condominium that occurred after the nation-state
reduced the dissolution threshold from a unanimity rule to a supermajority rule as
“akin to compulsory purchase”.81 We concur, but go further. Non-consensual disso-
lution is not just akin to, but is a form of taking – a private-to-private taking – in which
one private entity dispossesses another private entity of an interest in land. In this
section we address a number of possible concerns with describing the non-consensual
dissolution of condominium as an exercise of the takings power. In doing so, we note
the features that non-consensual dissolution shares with other forms of takings, but
also the uniqueness of this form of private-to-private or delegated takings. Finally, we
consider the non-consensual dissolution of condominiumwithin Waring’s suggested
typology for private-to-private takings and find that it straddles her proposed
categories.
Perhaps the most significant objection to the use of takings terminology to describe
the non-consensual dissolution of condominium is that takings are commonly under-
stood to involve not only the elimination of a property interest, but also its acquisition
by another entity. This is reflected in the description of the takings power in some
jurisdictions as ‘compulsory purchase’ or ‘compulsory acquisition’.82 In the non-con-
sensual dissolution of condominium, the ‘taking’ parties are not acquiring property
interests from those whose interests are being ‘taken’. Instead, they are terminating or
eliminating individual titles. However, the takings power, understood broadly,
includes the capacity to end or terminate property interests; it does not necessarily
require that another entity acquire those interests.83 Indeed, the realm of regulatory
80. R.C.B. Risk, ‘Condominiums and Canada’, 18University of Toronto Law Journal 1968, pp. 1-72, at p. 64-65.
81. Ter 2008, supra note 13, p. 49; Ter 2009, supra note 48, p. 509. Sood 2010, supra note 48, p. 67, describes it as
‘a new form of statutory sale’.
82. See K. Gray & S.F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 1387-1392.
83. Van der Walt 1999, supra note 20.
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taking revolves around limiting and, in some cases, terminating property interests; it
does not require the transfer of property interests, although Gray notes the apparent
Canadian exception to this proposition.84 The fact that there is no acquisition does not
disqualify thinking of this non-consensual termination of a property interest as a tak-
ing. As we explained in the introduction, our use of ‘takings’ terminology instead of
‘expropriation’ reflects its broader ambit.
Not only is the non-consensual dissolution of condominium a taking without acqui-
sition, the taking parties place themselves in the same position as those whose prop-
erty is taken; all individual titles in land will come to an end and all title holders will
become co-owners of the property that was formerly held as private and common
property within condominium. However, while the fact that all title holders end
up in the same position may have some bearing on our perception of the legitimacy
of this private-to-private takings, it does not invalidate the characterization of non-
consensual dissolution as a takings. Individual titles are still taken involuntarily from
some, even if the titles of others are terminated voluntarily.
Third, framing the power to instigate a non-consensual dissolution of condominium
as a taking of property does not fit the paradigm of a taking by a public entity for a
public purpose that animates most discussion of takings law. The takings power is
usually analyzed in the context of a non-consensual acquisition of a property interest
for a public purpose. Indeed, some jurisdictions have explicit constitutional provi-
sions requiring a public purpose for the taking of private property, although these
provisions have not eliminated discussion or debate about the scope or extent of pub-
lic purposes, sometimes reframed more broadly as public interest.85 Instead of taking
for a public purpose, the power to force the dissolution of condominium is all the
more extraordinary because it is a form of private-to-private taking: one private entity
terminates the property interests of another. In private-to-private takings, the state is
not involved, at least not directly, and the public purpose, if any, manifests itself indi-
rectly through some calculation that the property is better held by one owner than
another. Nonetheless, a public purpose or the public interest is commonly invoked
in discussions about the dissolution of condominium. In Singapore, legislators,
judges, and academics have characterized the public interest in redeveloping land
84. K. Gray, ‘Can Environmental Regulation Constitute a Taking of Property at Common Law?’, 24 Envi-
ronmental and Planning Law Journal 2007, pp. 161-181, at p. 176, n. 96, referring toCPR v City of Vancouver.
For a background to that case and a discussion of regulatory takings in Canada, seeD.C. Harris, ‘ARail-
way, ACity, and the Public Regulation of Private Property:CPR v. City of Vancouver’, in E. Tucker, B. Ziff
& J.Muir (Eds.),Property on Trial: Canadian Cases in Context, Osgoode Society for Canadian LegalHistory
and Irwin Law, Toronto, 2012, pp. 455-486.
85. Nowhere did this become more evident than in Kelo v. City of New London 545 US 469 2005, and the
extraordinary public and legislative reaction to the USSC decision. The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11, does not contain a property rights provision.
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and thus in having a dissolution rule that facilitates the redevelopment of land, as a
matter of urgent ‘national interest’.86 The law reform report on condominium in New
South Wales places the discussion of dissolution under the heading of ‘Urban
Renewal’.87 However, the state need not be directly involved, and nor must there
be an appeal to a public purpose in order to characterize the private termination of
property interests as takings.
A fourth potential objection to analyzing the non-consensual dissolution of condo-
minium as takings revolves around the question of consent. It is possible to construe
that individuals who acquire title within condominium have consented to the poten-
tial loss of that title at the instigation of other title holders. Justice Fenlon suggested as
much in her ruling on the Seymour Estates.88 Even in those regimes that require una-
nimity to dissolve condominium, a court may order dissolution over the objections of
some title holders, and therefore all title holders within condominium may be pre-
sumed to have consented to this possibility when acquiring their interests. However,
the extent towhich acquisition should be understood to entail consent may depend, at
least in part, on the notoriety of this aspect of condominium ownership. In the haste to
sell or buy units, the particular virtue of condominium ownership – individual title –
may obscure some of its limitations.89 Nonetheless, assuming that prior consent
exists, it emulates that which is assumed in the context of takings for public purposes.
Individuals may object to the state’s taking of their property, but are understood to
have recognized and consented to this possibility as a feature of the system within
which they hold their property interests. The fact that the title holders object to the
transfer or the termination of a property interest, whether by a public or private entity,
at the moment of its transfer or termination, constructs the event as a taking. Even if
we understand that title holders within condominium have given prior consent to the
possible loss of title, this does not disqualify the subsequent non-consensual dissolu-
tion as a taking.
However, if we insist on some form of consent as a necessary element of the legitimate
use of the takings power, then this affects proposals to move from a unanimity rule to
a supermajority to dissolve condominium. Title holders who acquired their titles
within the former regime may be understood to have given prior consent to the
non-consensual loss of their titles, but only if it occurs through a process supervised
by the courts and not simply by supermajority vote. If we are to understand title
holders, who acquired their interests under a unanimity rule, as having consented
to the possible loss of their titles by supermajority vote, then it requires pushing
86. Ter 2008, supra note 13, p. 98.
87. NSW 2012, supra note 14, p. 22.
88. McRae, supra note 19, para. 44.
89. See S. Blandy, J. Dixon, & A. Dupuis, ‘Theorising Power Relationships in Multi-owned Residential
Developments: Unpacking the Bundle of Rights’, 43 Urban Studies 2006, pp. 2373-2379.
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the notion of consent back to the recognition among all property holders that legis-
latures may change terms of ownership within a property regime. This is in fact
the case – legislatures do have the power, subject in many jurisdictions to constitu-
tional constraints, to alter property rules – but the fact that the consent to the potential
loss of a property interest is even more remote from the moment of taking may affect
how we think about the retroactive application of a rule that facilitates the non-con-
sensual dissolution of condominium and thus the taking of property.
Finally, the manner of compensation for title holders who lose their individual titles
when condominium is dissolved without their consent is unusual within the purview
of takings. Compensation is not a necessary element of takings law. Although it may
be required by constitutional provision or statute, the lack of compensation does not
disqualify the confiscation of property as a taking. In the non-consensual dissolution
of condominium, title holders whose interests are taken do not receive compensation
from those initiating the dissolution, but they do receive the exchange value of their
interests. When condominium is dissolved, the former title holders become co-
owners, as tenants in common, and will receive the value of their co-ownership inter-
est when the property is sold. It would be unusual for the exchange value of that
interest to be lower than the the sale price of their individual title. Indeed, the prin-
cipal motivation for dissolving condominium lies in an assessment that the exchange
value of the co-ownership interests on dissolution exceeds that of the individual titles
within condominium. If subjective assessments of value are put aside, as they are in
most takings compensation regimes, and only themarket or exchange value of respec-
tive interests considered, then the former title holders (including those who sought or
opposed dissolution) are at least no worse and usually better off when condominium
is dissolved. This outcome mimics the requirements of most constitutional provisions
and expropriation statutes. If the goal of compensation provisions within takings law
is to replace a property interest with its exchange value, objectively determined, then
that is achieved when condominium is dissolved and the remaining interests sold.
Moreover, the fact that the title holders who precipitate non-consensual dissolution
put themselves in the same position as those who are not consenting creates an incen-
tive to pursue dissolution only when it will maximize the exchange value of the inter-
ests in land.
In sum, not only is the non-consensual dissolution of condominium analogous or akin
to the takings power; it should be thought of as a form of private-to-private taking.
Moreover, it is a form of private-to-private taking that enables the assembly of land
for the purposes of its redevelopment. Bell describes takings for land assembly “as the
proto-typical case where takings are necessary to overcome strategic barriers to
voluntary transactions”.90 He is referring principally to holdouts and bilateral
90. Bell 2009, supra note 22, p. 567.
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monopolies, two prominent examples (discussed in the following section) from a
larger set of transaction costs that inhibit efficient resource allocations and that takings
provisions attempt to overcome. Regimes that permit the non-consensual dissolution
of condominium endeavor to circumvent these same challenges to the efficient allo-
cation of resources. As a result, the non-consensual dissolution of condominium
should not be thought of as fitting awkwardly within the purview of takings, but
instead as a clear example of the takings power.
Waring describes three variants of private-to-private takings that she distinguishes, at
least in part, on the source of authority for the taking.91 In the first instance, the
authority of one private entity to take the property of another arises explicitly in stat-
ute, as in the case of the statutes that enable utility companies to take private land to
facilitate the distribution of their products.92 The second category includes authority
for private takings that arises in the common law, such as in the law of adverse pos-
session, which establishes when a squatter will acquire the property interest of the
title holder. Waring’s third and final category of private-to-private takings includes
those that occur as an incidence of or within a larger regulatory regime, and which
authorize a partial taking. She uses the example of restrictions on the capacity to
exclude neighboring owners, in doing so stressing that this third category of pri-
vate-to-private takings results in the loss of a right within the bundle of property
rights, but not of the whole bundle.93
The private-to-private taking that operates when condominium is dissolved without
the consent of all title holders straddles Waring’s first and third categories. In relation
to the first, the authority to take through the non-consensual dissolution of condomin-
ium is less explicitly authorized than it is an incidence of a larger regulatory regime
that enables title holders to make decisions that affect the interests of other title
holders. This suggests Waring’s third category might be the better fit. However,
the property right that is taken when condominium is dissolved is not one among
the bundle of ownership rights. It is the individual freehold title. The purpose of ter-
minating that title is not to diminish a bundle that otherwise remains intact, but to
dismantle ownership within condominium. Condominium legislation that permits
non-consensual dissolution has the effect of enabling private entities to extinguish
the property in land of another private entity without consent, although the statutes
do not label or acknowledge it as a takings power. The capacity to take the property of
another comes in the form of a supermajority vote or the opportunity to seek a court
order to dissolve condominium.
91. Waring 2013, supra note 21.
92. Id., pp. 243-247.
93. Id., pp. 252-257.
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. DISSOLVING CONDOMINIUM, TAKINGS , AND CONCEPT IONS OF
PROPERTY
The non-consensual dissolution of condominium is a form of private takings in which
some title holders exercise the power to wind-up the condominium corporation and
terminate individual titles. “The central question of takings law”, argues Singer, “is
whether the obligations imposed on an owner by a property law rule are just and
fair”.94 Answers to this question vary considerably, perhaps particularly in the
domain of private takings.95 The US Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of
New London, which condoned the taking of privately held titles to residential proper-
ties to prevent their owners from blocking a large-scale land assembly and redevel-
opment by another private entity, attracted extraordinary public, legislative, and
academic attention, and reveals the extent to which takings can provoke intense
debate in some jurisdictions over its use.96 For our purposes, the takings literature
is useful because it reveals that the choice between condominium regimes that enable
or restrict non-consensual dissolution, and therefore that enable or restrict the takings
power, is also a choice between conceptions of property and between the functions
that the institution of property is to serve. In setting the rules for non-consensual dis-
solution, legislators and judges are making choices about property; they are shaping
the form of property in land and establishing its purposes.
In their analyses of takings jurisprudence in the United States, Rose and Singer argue
that the debate over the takings power is a function of different and competing con-
ceptions of property.97 Rose goes one step further to suggest that the choice between
competing conceptions or models of property depends on another, prior question:
“what are we trying to accomplish with a property regime?”98 Once we know the
goals of a property regime, then we can define the parameters of private property,
identify takings, and determine the circumstances in which the takings power is legit-
imate. However, the nature of property and its uses are not fully formed in advance of
disputes over the takings power: the idea of property is being constructed in the leg-
islative and judicial determinations of the takings power. Given what is at stake, it is
hardly surprising that the legitimate scope of the takings power attracts much atten-
tion and debate.
Rose suggests two competing visions of property and its purposes that underlie the
takings debate in the United States: the dominant contemporary vision of property as
94. Singer 2006, supra note 23, p. 338.
95. But seeWaring 2013, supra note 21, on the ubiquity and uncontested acceptance ofmany forms of private
taking.
96. Kelo, supra note 85.
97. Rose 1994, supra note 24, p. 50; Singer 2006, supra note 23, p. 317.
98. Rose 1994, supra note 24, p. 50.
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a vehicle for preference satisfaction “that, first and foremost, maximizes the satisfac-
tion of preferences by maximizing wealth”;99 and an older, republican vision that
understands property not “as a set of tradeable and ultimately interchangeable
goods” but rather as a “vehicle for propriety and decent good order”.100 Alexander
describes this older (and he argues enduring) conception of property as propriety this
way: “property is the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper
social order, the private basis for the public good”.101 These goals of wealth maximi-
zation and of constructing a particular social order may overlap, but the institution of
property will be modeled on the prevailing vision of its purposes, and takings law is
one location for that modeling.
Singer also suggests two dominant models of property in US takings jurisprudence:
the first marshals the image of a castle, the second trades on the owner as investor.102
In its most fortified form, the castle model constructs an impenetrable wall around
private property. Property interests can never be transferred or terminated without
the owner’s consent; owners have veto powers over any attempt to dislodge them
of their property. Property interests are secure. On the other hand, “the investment
model focuses instead on protecting the justified expectations of investors”.103 Property
owners are entitled to a reasonable return on their investments based on justified
expectations, but not necessarily to their property. In this model, property’s value
is secure. Singer goes on to argue that the veto inherent in the castle model “gives
the owner too much power,” while the right to fair market value of the investment
model “gives owners too few rights”.104 Both need tempering, and he argues for a
citizenshipmodel of property to better capture the rights, but also the responsibilities,
of ownership. We return to the citizenship model below.
Singer’s castle and investment models of property bring to mind Calabresi’s and
Melamed’s much-discussed distinction between entitlements protected with a prop-
erty rule and those protected with a liability rule.105 Property rules require that the
holders of entitlements voluntarily agree to their transfer. Liability rules provide that
an entitlement may be destroyed if its holder receives its value.106 The property rule
requires consent; the liability rule affords compensation. Calabresi and Melamed
focus on remedies, not specifically on the nature of property, but as Rose points
out, “property remedied by a liability rule is not the same as property remedied
99. Id., p. 52
100. Id., pp. 59, 64.
101. G. Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought, 1776-
1970, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, at p. 1.
102. Singer 2006, supra note 23.
103. Id., p. 323 (emphasis in original).
104. Id., p. 316 (reference omitted).
105. Calabresi & Melamed 1971, supra note 25.
106. Id., p. 1092.
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by property rules”.107 The liability rule protects the exchange value of property even
though the interest itself may be lost; the property rule secures the interest or entitle-
ment itself, but not necessarily its exchange value because, as in the case of land
assembly, those with a veto may block a transfer that might generate the most value.
Among their examples, Calabresi and Melamed describe the assembly of many pri-
vately owned lots to create a park in order to illustrate the circumstances (individual
financial preferences set against the strategic barriers that would inhibit preference
maximization) in which the liability rule (to allow the state to exercise its takings
power to assemble land) is preferred.108
Abraham Bell takes up Calabresi andMelamed inmaking the case for private takings.
In doing so, he outlines the conditions under which private takings are appropriate,
and even to be preferred, to takings by a public authority:
a private taking power should be granted where the dual conditions of an appropriate tak-
ing are met: (1) the taker is the preferred owner of the property right (for reasons of justice or
efficiency); and (2) strategic difficulties block the efficient or just transfer of property rights in
the market place.109
Bell does not elaborate on what he means by “for reasons of justice”, or what the
conditions of a ‘just transfer’ might be, except perhaps to imply that the efficient
allocation of property encompasses its just allocation. Instead, he focuses on the
question of efficiency and on when private takings may be justified to overcome
‘strategic difficulties’ that block the efficient transfer of property rights. These stra-
tegic difficulties include two of the most commonly discussed transactions costs that
inhibit the smooth operation of markets: holdouts and bilateral monopolies.110
Holdouts describe situations where an individual or a small subset of the larger
group blocks a transfer and, by doing so, the efficient allocation of resources. Bilat-
eral monopolies describe the circumstance of one buyer and one seller; each must
deal with the other, so each can block the other. In both instances, efficient resource
allocations may be barred, and where they are, Bell argues, the delegation of a pri-
vate takings power to overcome ‘strategic difficulties’ may be justified.111 Building
on Calabresi and Melamed, and using a similar example of land assembly, Bell
argues for a ‘pliability rule’ in which the remedies shift from property rule protec-
tion (consent required to transfer) to a liability rule protection (entitled to compen-
sation for transfer), which enables a private entity to pry a property interest loose
from a non-consenting owner, and then back to a property rule when the entitlement
107. C. Rose, ‘Property and Expropriation: Themes andVariations in American Law’, 2000Utah LawReview
2000, pp. 1-38, at p. 10.
108. Calabresi & Melamed 1971, supra note 25, p. 1106-1108.
109. Bell 2009, supra note 22, p. 558.
110. Id., pp. 530-31.
111. Id., pp. 530-531.
10 ‘Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, and the Nature of Property’
is in the hands of the taker.112 In this sequence, Bell claims “full compensation is the
key to properly incentivizing private takers in land assembly”.113
These fragments of the takings scholarship reveal its usefulness in analyzing the non-
consensual dissolution of condominium. In terms of the dichotomy constructed by
Calabresi and Melamed, the choice between unanimity or supermajority rule is a
choice between a property or liability rule. The unanimity rule provides a veto; the
supermajority rule permits the taking but provides compensation. In Singer’s cas-
tle/investment dichotomy, the unanimity rule buttresses the castle model, the super-
majority rule enhances the investment model. In practice, the distinctions are not so
sharp. Under both unanimity and supermajority regimes, the option exists for a title
holder to seek a dissolution order through the courts, but this only defers to the courts
the decision of whether to construct property primarily in the image of a castle or an
investment, or to deploy a property or liability rule.
At this point, we return to the conflicts over the dissolution of Strata VR 1411, Cypress
Gardens, and Seymour Estates to analyze them as disputes over the legitimacy of pri-
vate-to-private takings. In the first instance, the cases may be interpreted as providing
examples of the strategic barriers to land assembly that inhibit efficient allocations of
property interests, but which the delegation of a takings power could overcome.
Strata VR 1411 involved only three title holders, one of whom opposed the other two in
their efforts to dissolve the condominium. The pair of title holders had to deal with the
third, creating a bilateralmonopoly and the possibility that intransigence on one or both
sides could frustrate the efficient allocation of resources.114 Whatever the optimal out-
come in this case, it is clear from themultiple court proceedings and the lack of action on
the property – neither renovation nor dissolution – that the title holders could not
resolve the dispute themselves. Even so, the court gave the parties a final opportunity
to negotiate a settlement. Without pronouncing on whether the court should have
ordered the dissolution to secure the efficient outcome (a determination that would
require a cost–benefit accounting), the conflict between title holders in Strata VR
1411 appears an instance where a property rule in the context of a bilateral monopoly
might well frustrate that allocation. If so, then a liability rule to allow the two title
holders who sought dissolution to dismantle the condominium over the objections
of the third title holderwould facilitate the efficient outcome.All title holders, including
the dissenter, would receive more for their shares in a subsequent sale of the remaining
co-owned land than they would have received for the individual sale of their units.
112. Id., at p. 541. See alsoA. Bell andG. Parchomovsky, ‘Pliability Rules’, 101Michigan LawReview 2002, pp. 1-79.
113. Id., p. 573.
114. A bilateral monopoly is a particular type of holdout involving two parties. Although there aremore than
two parties involved in this scenario, we have described it as a bilateral monopoly because there are two
clear and opposing positions on the question of dissolution, and each side must deal with the other.
However, the single title holder seeking an assessment order could also be described as a holdout.
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Cypress Gardens and Seymour Estates present remarkably similar circumstances
except for the proportion of title holders who opposed dissolution. This difference
largely explains the different outcomes. In Seymour Estates, a minority of less than
10% were opposed. As such, they were holdouts frustrating the will of the more-than
90%who wished to sell. Although the judge did not speak of efficient allocation or do
an explicit cost–benefit accounting, her decision to grant a dissolution order reflected
the preponderance of opinion in favor of a sale. Its effect was to allow a supermajority
to overcome the barrier to land assembly presented by the few holdouts. In the case of
Cypress Gardens, it is difficult to discern from the decision exactly how many title
holders within the common-law condominium sought to dissolve it and how many
wished it to continue. However, it is clear that those who wished to preserve the con-
dominiumwere not a small minority, andmaywell have been themajority. The judge
could not construct them as holdouts that were preventing a large majority of title
holders from achieving their goals and so did not order dissolution.
Whether a permissive takings rule is necessary to secure efficient outcomes requires
an empirical determination based on analysis of strategic barriers that inhibit the mar-
ket in property interests. We have not done an efficiency analysis of the conflicts over
Cypress Gardens, Seymour Estates, and Strata VR 1411, but the preceding discussion
assumes that it can be done and that, in some instances, a private-to-private takings
through the non-consensual dissolution of condominium, to overcome holdouts or
circumvent a bilateral monopoly, would facilitate the assembly of property interests
and secure their optimal allocation. Within this analytical frame, the role for legisla-
tors is to establish a regime that deploys a liability rule to permit the non-consensual
dissolution of condominium when it would be efficient to do so. Similarly, when the
decision in individual cases is deferred to judges, their role is to determine whether a
liability rule, to enable non-consensual dissolution and facilitate land assembly,
would facilitate efficient allocations.
Although the decisions seem to correspond with an efficiency analysis, the language
in the three decisions suggests there is more at stake in these conflicts than the efficient
allocation of property. In fact, Singer’s dichotomy of castle and investment models of
property captures the choice that judges confront when hearing cases involving the
non-consensual dissolution of condominium. In Cypress Gardens and Strata Plan VR
1411, the line between those who sought to dissolve condominium and those who
wished to retain their property interests within condominium was also the line
between owner-investors and resident-owners.115 In both cases, the owner-investors
sought to maximize the value of their investments and in doing so articulated a vision
of property based on their justified expectations as investors. Their interests as title
115. The correlation is less pronounced in Seymour Estates as some of those who petitioned to dissolve the
condominium were resident-owners, but the affidavit evidence recounted by the judge reveals that
those who opposed dissolution were resident-owners. See McRae, supra note 19, paras 29-37.
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holders, indeed the property interests of all title holders, were more valuable if the
condominium structures were dissolved, and a dissolution order would enable all
title holders to realize that value. The role of a property interest was to protect, even
to maximize value for its holder. On the other hand, the resident-owners fought dis-
solution in order to retain their individual titles and, by doing so, their homes. In chal-
lenging the owner-investors, the resident-owners articulated a model of property
based not on investor value or maximizing wealth, but on the home as the fulcrum
of social life. Property interests in homes were not to be thought of primarily in terms
of fungible, transferable objects of value, but rather as a means to secure autonomous
and fulfilling lives embedded within community. Property interests might well pro-
tect the expectations of owners as investors, but that role ought to be secondary to the
protection of the property interests themselves when the property in question was the
home. In articulating their opposition to the dissolution of condominium, they pre-
sented a model of property as castle.
The resident-owners were also presenting a vision of the appropriate function for
property in the home. It was a vision, echoing Rose and Alexander, of property as
propriety, of property as securing the private basis of a public life. In the context
of condominium and other common-interest communities, a ‘public life’ exists within
the legal structure and beyond it. The dissolution of condominium dismantles the
mechanism for collective governance and destroys the public or communal life of title
holders within the legal form. This may not be a particular concern formany, and per-
haps most condominium ‘communities’, which use the legal form primarily to create
individual titles rather than an intentional community. However, property interests
within condominium can act to secure a place in the public life within and beyond the
legal form, and the resident-owners who opposed dissolution described their prop-
erty interests as the basis for their continuing presence and capacity to participate
in the public realms of neighborhood and municipality. Protecting their private prop-
erty also involved securing their place within the larger public realm.116
The decisions reveal that the determination of whether the exercise of the takings
power is just and fair depends on the prevailing concept of property and its purposes.
A regime that is premised on the owner-as-investor model of property and focused on
maximizing preference satisfaction may well produce a different answer about the
justness and fairness of takings than a regime intended to construct or perpetuate
a vision of the public that stretches beyond facilitating the interactions of wealth-max-
imizing individuals. The non-consensual dissolution of condominium is a form of pri-
vate-to-private taking. As such, the choice between constructing a regime that inhibits
116. The dissolution rule is not the only site of conflict within condominium between resident-owners and
owner-investors. SeeR. Lippert, ‘GoverningCondominiums andRenterswith Legal Knowledge Flows
and External Institutions’, 34 Law & Policy 2012, pp. 263-290, on the divergent interest in regulating of
renters.
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non-consensual dissolution of condominium (with a unanimity rule) and another that
facilitates it (with a supermajority rule), is also a choice between conceptions of prop-
erty.When legislators choose between a unanimity rule and a supermajority rule they
are also constructing the nature of property within condominium. Legislators in Flor-
ida recognized as much when announcing that they were acting “to preserve the
value of the property interests and the rights of alienation” in the shift to a superma-
jority rule.117 Similarly, when judges are asked to consider granting a dissolution
order, they are also being asked to rule on the nature of property within condominium.
In those determinations, they are constructing a particular conception of property.
The jurisdictions that are examining their dissolution rules and considering change
need to ask what role they ascribe to property within condominium. Given that prop-
ertywill invariably play a number of roles, the better question iswhich role should have
priority. Moreover, this question is best answered with a clear understanding of how
property within condominium is used. Residential and commercial property serve dif-
ferent functions, so may produce different priorities and thus suggest different rules.
But while attention to the uses of property within condominium is important, legisla-
tors who are choosing between dissolution regimes (and thus conceptions of property)
are also making choices that will have an impact beyond the particular form of own-
ership. The rapidly increasing prominence of condominium as a form of ownership in
land means that determinations about the nature of property within condominium are
increasingly definitive determinations of the nature of property in land.
. CONDOMINIUM, DISSOLUTION, AND THE NATURE OF PROPERTY
The events that cause interests in land to come to an end reveal much about the nature
of those interests. Indeed, within the common law, the two broad categories of estates
(freehold and leasehold) and even the different forms of freehold estates (fee simple,
fee tail, and life estates) are defined by their end points.118 The dissolution of condo-
minium brings separate titles to an end; former title holders become co-owners, as
tenants in common, of all the property that was held in individual titles and as com-
mon property within condominium. Our final claims are, first, that the rule determin-
ing the degree of consent required to dissolve condominium is a singularly and
increasingly important site in determining what it means to hold property in condo-
minium, and second, that condominium is the crucible inwhich contemporary under-
standings of property in land are being forged.
117. Fla. Stat., Condominium Act, § 718.117(1) (2007).
118. This idea was elegantly captured inWalsingham’s Case (1573) 2 Plowd 547 at 555, 75 ER 805 at 816-817:
“the land itself is one thing, and the estate in land is another thing, for an estate in the land is a time in
the land, or land for a time, and there are diversities of estates, which are no more than diversities of
time”.
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As one form of common-interest community, condominium has attracted the atten-
tion of property theorists for its blending of property rights,119 or mixing of property
regimes.120 Lehavi categorizes common-interest communities as private–common
hybrids, and describes them as one among a “proliferation of property configurations”
that offer advantages over the ‘pure’ property regimes of private, common, and state or
public property.121 Similarly, Dagan andHeller suggest that the idea of the ‘liberal com-
mons’ augments “the well-worn trilogy of ownership forms that constitute the concep-
tual apparatus of property law”.122 Their intent is to describe the forms of property that
recognize the rights of individuals (liberal) embedded within community (commons).
As Heller argues in a later piece, “[e]very liberal commons form creates the conditions
in which people can achieve the economic and social gains possible from cooperation,
while also ensuring that individual autonomy exists on reasonable terms”.123 All these
scholars suggest the mixed, blended, or hybrid property institutions offer better solu-
tions to the tragedies of the commons (overuse) and anti-commons (underuse), than
any of the pure or standard forms of property. But regardless of these normative claims,
the hybrid forms of ownership that layer different property interests deserve attention
because of their prominence. “More and more”, write Dagan and Heller, “as ‘sole and
despotic dominion’ fades from economic life, versions of liberal commons regimes are
becoming the dominant form of ownership”.124
Whether understood as hybrid property or liberal commons, the legal form of condo-
minium requires close attention to the relations between title holders in order to
understand the nature of their property interests. Alexander describes condominium
and other legal forms that create common-interest communities as ‘governance prop-
erty’, a category that he distinguishes from ‘exclusion property’ in order to emphasize
the importance of relations between owners in understanding the nature of prop-
erty.125 The prominence accorded the right to exclude as the defining characteristic
119. M. Heller, ‘Common Interest Developments at the Crossroads of Legal Theory’, 37Urban Lawyer 2005,
pp. 329-334, at p. 331.
120. Lehavi 2008, supra note 8; S. Blandy, ‘Collective Property: Owning and Sharing Residential Space’, in
N. Hopkins (Ed.), Modern Studies in Property Law, Vol. 7, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013, pp. 151-172,
p. 163, suggests the term ‘collective property’ to describe the owning and sharing that are essential
elements of co-housing developments.
121. Lehavi 2008, supra note 8, pp. 140, 141; see alsoW. Schwartz, ‘Condominium: Hybrid Castle in the Sky’,
44 Boston University Law Review 1964, pp. 37-55, who noted this hybrid quality in an early analysis of
condominium in the United States.
122. Dagan & Heller 2000, supra note 32, p. 555.
123. Heller 2005, supra note 119, p. 333. J. Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and
the Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 130, makes a generalized claim about possibilities
that emerge when moving beyond the public or private to legal forms that recognize their combina-
tion: “Freeing ourselves frommisleading categories and false choices opens the possibility of individ-
ual autonomy in the context of collectivity”.
124. Dagan & Heller 2000, supra note 32, pp. 622-623.
125. Alexander 2011, supra note 31, p. 1858.
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of property in much property theory is inadequate, he argues, particularly in relation
to forms of governance property, such as condominium, where the character and
quality of the property interests are defined as much by the relations between owners
as by the capacity to exclude third parties or by any other relationship between
owners and third parties. A focus on multi-ownership property reveals “ownership’s
internal relations are every bit as essential to understanding ownership as are its
external relations”.126
Attempting to shift from a singular preoccupation with rights toward an understand-
ing of property that includes recognition of obligations or responsibilities, Singer has
long called for more attention to the relational elements of ownership.127 Instead of
the castle or investment dichotomy, he offers a third conception of ownership – a ‘cit-
izenship model’ – and suggests it “starts from the assumption that obligations are
inherent to ownership”.128 Applied in the context of takings law, where the invest-
ment model provides inadequate protection for property and the castle model too
much, the citizenship model, in Singer’s formulation, recognizes that the obligations
of ownership may require an owner to cede property in the public interest, but the
rights of ownership stipulate that the taking is to occur only so long as it is just
and fair.129 He goes on to situate ownership within community:
Part of what it means to be a member of society, to be an owner among owners, is to be part
of a real or imagined social contract that limits liberty to enlarge liberty, that limits property
to secure property.130
This invocation of the need to recognize the limits of property in order to secure prop-
erty describes the nature of ownership within condominium better than ownership of
land outside condominium. Within condominium, private interests are indelibly
bound with common interests and with the capacity of the group to regulate and
place limits on the private and common property. Moreover, within condominium
a title holder is ‘an owner among owners’much more obviously than outside condo-
minium, where many will not be owners of interests in land, at least not of freehold
interests. Condominium creates a community of title holders, with the potentially
problematic capacity to sequester itself from a greater sense of the public.131
126. Id., p. 1887. Alexander goes on to argue that not only does governance property better describe the
nature of property, but that it is also normatively preferable to further the goal of human flourishing.
See also J. Leslie, ‘Pluralist Moral Theory in the Philosophy of Property and the Legal Form of the Con-
dominium’ (LLM thesis, The University of British Columbia, October 2015).
127. J.W. Singer, ‘The Reliance Interest in Property’, 40 Stanford Law Review 1988, pp. 611-751.
128. Singer 2006, supra note 23, p. 329.
129. Id., p. 338.
130. Id., p. 329.
131. The fact that condominium and other forms of common-interest community create communities on
the basis of ownership rather than residence or citizenship has formed the basis of a sustained critique.
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Nonetheless, as owners among owners, within a structure where individual owner-
ship is inseparably tied to co-ownership of common property, the collectively
imposed limits on title holders are not only inescapable, but necessary to secure
the private interests.
As one form of property hybrid, condominium combines interests in private property
with common property to construct autonomous space for individuals within a com-
munity of its making. It is this combination of rights that establishes the foundation
for condominium, but the interests co-exist in the tension that the legal form creates
between individual and community, or between autonomous and collective decision-
making. Sorting out what if any hierarchy exists between the private and common
property interests within condominium is mostly unnecessary. The interests co-exist
peaceably, the common property supporting the private, or the private nested within
the common – it does not matter much which way the co-existence is understood.
Nonetheless, the particular attraction of condominium over other legal forms that
subdivide ownership within multi-unit developments is its capacity to create individ-
ual titles in land. Therefore, the choice of condominium reflects an orientation toward
private property; as one early observer of condominium noted, it enables purchasers
“to achieve more concomitants of ownership than are now available to renters or to
cooperators”.132 Viewed as a form of ownership designed to construct individual
titles, the common property interest within condominium plays a supporting role
to the private property; the common property exists to enable the private. However,
when condominium is dissolved, the private titles disappear. They are displaced by
co-ownership interests, which are allocated between co-owners based on the size or
quantity of the private titles. This allocation reflects the prominence of the private
interests and their continuing effect even after termination, but it is only co-ownership
that endures the end of condominium. As a result, whatever their relative position
during the lifetime of condominium, the choice of dissolution rule is also a determi-
nation on the relative strength of individual interests and co-ownership interests
within condominium.
The different weighting of private and common interests in the dissolution rules illus-
trates Alexander’s argument about the importance of relations between title holders
in defining the nature and character of the property interests they hold. Title holders
within condominium in jurisdictions with a supermajority rule hold different inter-
ests than those same title holders under a unanimity rule. The supermajority rule
The literature focuses on homeowner associations in the United States, but the concerns are germane to
condominium. Early and influential pieces include: E. McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations
and the Rise of Residential Private Government, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994; E. Blakey
and M.J. Snyder, Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States, Brookings Institution Press,
Washington, 1997.
132. C.J. Berger, ‘Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation’, 63 Columbia Law Review 1963, pp. 987-
1026, at p. 989.
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constructs property to protect its exchange value for the owner as investor, the una-
nimity rule to protect the interest itself for the owner, usually as resident or occupant.
This division is not absolute. Even in jurisdictions with a supermajority rule, the fact
that a simplemajority vote is insufficient to precipitate the non-consensual dissolution
is recognition that the extraordinary power to terminate individual titles, in order to
maximize exchange value, must be tempered in deference to other values, such as the
capacity to be secure in one’s home. Similarly, those jurisdictions with a unanimity
rule do not protect individual titles at all costs. Recognizing that a small minority
of title holders who refuse to consent to dissolutionmay frustrate the legitimate needs
of the remaining title holders and possibly the interests of the larger society, jurisdic-
tions with a unanimity rule provide the possibility of court-ordered dissolution.
Nonetheless, the change from a supermajority to a unanimity rulemarks a fundamen-
tal shift in the orientation of property interests within the legal and conceptual frame-
work of condominium. This shift is achieved by reordering relations among title
holders, shifting the balance internally between private and common property inter-
ests or between individual and collective decision-making, not by changing the prop-
erty relations between title holders and those outside condominium.
However, to recognize that a unanimity rule bolsters the strength of individual titles is
not to claim that it provides greater protection for property interests within condo-
minium. Similarly, if the bundle of sticks metaphor for property is helpful in under-
standing propertywithin condominium, then it is not the case that jurisdictionswith a
unanimity rule provide title holders with an extra or a bigger stick in the property
bundle. The choice between unanimity and supermajority rules is not a choice
betweenmore or less property. Instead, the two rules present different models or con-
ceptions of property. The unanimity rule bolsters the ownership interest, albeit at the
cost of the exchange value; the supermajority protects the exchange value, at the cost
of the ownership interest.133 If the goal of the property regime were to protect the
capacity of resident-owners to remain in their homes, then the unanimity rule is
the better choice. Conversely, if a property regime were designed to secure the
exchange value of property interests, then the supermajority rule is the more appro-
priate. In fact, the rules in all jurisdictions are compromises that reflect attempts to
find some middle ground between conceptions of property that prioritize different
things. But even in attempting to locate that middle ground, the choice is not between
133. T.K. Sood, ‘Collective Sales of Strata Developments: The Singapore Approach’, 8 Australian Property
Law Journal 2000, pp. 157-174, at pp. 160-161, suggests: “the question is really one of balancing two
components of the right to property in a strata development, namely, the right of one group (the
minority owners) which would like to hold on to the property and an equally legitimate right of
another group (the majority owners) which wants to exercise its rights to alienate property”. This
is a variation of the choice described by the French legal philosopher R. Demogue, ‘Security’, in A.
Fouilleé et al. (Eds.), Modern French Legal Philosophy, Boston Book Company, Boston, 1916, p. 418 at
pp. 427-431 [translated by F.W. Scott and J.P. Chamberlain], between static or dynamic security:
the first protects the interest, the second secures its transfer.
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more or less property. Rather, the choice is between different conceptions of what
property is, and what it is to achieve.
Choices about the nature and purpose of property are not, of course, confined to prop-
erty within condominium. They recur across the spectrum of common-law property
doctrine, within civil codes and statutes, in constitutional provisions delimiting prop-
erty rights and state obligations, and in the articles of international agreements. There
is no single doctrinal or institutional location that acts as the arbiter of property or its
definition. The sites that combine to construct the nature of property are diffuse and
extend beyond the formal legal setting. However, the fact that the sites are dispersed
does not make them equal: law may invoke the authority of the state to displace tra-
dition or practice, judges write decisions within court hierarchies, common-law doc-
trine gives way to legislative intervention, statute must accord with constitutional
provision, treaties establish supra-national structures that have the capacity to super-
sede domestic law.Moreover, the relative importance of these sites changes over time.
Even in common-law jurisdictions, legislatures have usurped the role, once assumed
by the courts, as the principal arbiters of the idea and nature property. Statutory con-
dominium provides one example of this shift.
Among this panoply of legal forums, we view condominium as a singularly impor-
tant site in the molding of contemporary understandings of property. Its rising posi-
tion as the legal architecture of ownership in cities around theworld has accompanied
the accelerating urbanization of human society in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
Condominium facilitates ownership where human population densities are high,
and its prevalence requires that we regard its effect on the shape and form of property
in land.
Within the crucible of condominium, the rules that govern the process for dissolving
the constituent elements of ownership are key determinants of the nature of that own-
ership, and understanding the non-consensual dissolution as a private-to-private tak-
ings helps tomake this clear. Moreover, the dissolution rules are only going to become
more important. Statutory condominium is a relatively new legal form that, for the
most part, structures ownership in newly constructed buildings. As those buildings
age, decisions regarding their replacement, and therefore about the dissolution of con-
dominium, inevitably become more pressing. The choice of rule about the degree of
consent required to dissolve condominium will matter more, and will be an increas-
ingly critical determinant of the shape and form of property within condominium.
Understanding the non-consensual dissolution of condominium as a taking also
reveals that the tension between private and common property within condominium
is a product of the same fault-line that runs more generally between private and pub-
lic interests, or between individual and community. The takings analysis is useful in
analyzing the non-consensual dissolution of condominium precisely because the
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tension between individual and collective within condominium mirrors that same
tension in other interests in land. But the insights may travel in both directions. What
transpires within condominium is useful for understanding what is happening
beyond condominium as well.
As a form of ownership, condominium is particularly striking because the private
interests that it creates so obviously depend on the co-existence of common property.
It is not possible to maintain the private interests within condominium without the
support of the common property. Although it may be less transparent, this is also
the case for private interests in land beyond condominium. It is possible to suppose
that private property exists independently, detached from other interests, because it is
not so clearly bound with common property as it is within condominium. An insis-
tence on the right to exclude (or variations of it) as the single defining feature of pri-
vate property tends to reinforce and perpetuate this illusion of separation and
detachment. But this is untenable. Condominium has the virtue of reminding us that
private property is embedded in community. The takings analysis brings the tension
between individual and community into the open, clarifying the choice between con-
dominium regimes that facilitate and restrict non-consensual dissolution and reveal-
ing its significance as nothing less than establishing the nature of property in land.
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